A short introduction to mean field games
Mean field games have been introduced by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions in two seminal papers [LL06a, LL06b] . They have been used in economic models and noticeably to model endogeneous growth. Here, we want to detail a reference case that can be used to build and study a lot of mean field games models.
An idea from physics...
To well understand the nature of mean field games, the best thing to do is certainly to focus on the notion of "mean field". This notion is in fact inspired from particle physics. Typically, particle physicists are interested in interactions between so many particles that they cannot use traditional physics and study each interaction among couples or triples of particles. Instead of that they rely on a statistical idea: to study interactions between particles they use a media and the mean field is this media. To clarify, this field is created, in a certain sense, by the particles and impact the behavior of the particles "who" created it. Hence, the interactions between particles is summed up by the interaction between every single particle and the mean field, which is, in some sense, representative of the particles as a whole. The simplest example is air pressure: pressure is created by the microscopic movements of the particles and impacts particles in a macroscopic
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... that can be used in game theory and economics
The same reasoning can be used when it comes to model strategic interactions between many agents in economics. A "mean field" could be used to have a relevant representation of reality. This remark is the starting point of mean field game theory. As a first example, the heart of modern economics that is the general equilibrium theory, can be considered a mean field game where the mean field is obviously the vector of prices. Prices are indeed a relevant summary of interactions between agents and, in turn, they influence each agent behavior. This approach certainly clarifies what a market is: the market exists because of agents interactions and, in turn, the market induces individual behaviors. The market is an example of mean field games but mean field games are in fact a general tool to embed externality in models since mean fields are not constrained to be prices. Penetration rates for technologies such as wind turbines or solar panels are instances of mean field. Other examples can be found in green economics like rankings of countries regarding their efforts to reduce greenhouse effect gases emission.
The new theory developed to study mean field games brings a comprehensive mathematical framework, some new concepts and a new way to build models.
The definition of mean field games
The general framework of mean field game theory is given by four hypotheses:
• Rational expectations
• Continuum of agents
• Agents anonymity
• Social interactions of the mean field type
The first three hypotheses are common in game theory. The first onethe rational expectation hypothesis -has been introduced in the 60's and is now widely accepted among game theorists. The second hypothesis is often used to model games with a large number of players. It's a rather well accepted approximation that has been used for tractability purposes and here, for mean field games, the limit of a game with N players as N goes to infinity has been studied in [LL07a, LL07b] to support this hypothesis. The third hypothesis has always been implicit in game theory but is worth recalling. Basically, it says that agents are anonymous in the sense that any permutation of the agents does not change the outcome of the game. The fourth hypothesis is specific to mean field games and is an hypothesis on interactions between players 1 . The main idea is that a given agent cannot take into account every single agent she is going to interact with. Therefore, every agent is going to make a decision according to some statistics regarding the overall community of agents. Moreover, this fourth assumption means that an agent is really atomized in the continuum and has no power but a marginal one. Since she cannot influence (but marginally) the behavior of other agents, she has no other choices than considering a strategy that depends only on herself and on information about the overall community, this information being enclosed in the mean field. In other words, the couple (x, m) is sufficient and exhaustive to explain interactions, where x is a personal characteristics and m the distribution of those characteristics in the population.
A first class of mean field games
From a mathematical point of view, a first class of mean field games, and this class is the purpose of this paper, appeared in a stochastic control form. With this representation, each agent can control -with a costthe drift and/or the volatility of a diffusion process and maximizes (in expectancy) a utility criterium that depends on this dynamical process and on the mean field of the problem. This type of framework is really common in finance, in economics or in engineering and corresponds, in the deterministic case to variations calculus. Noticeably, even in the stochastic case, the problem, as far as the players are concerned as a whole, stays deterministic because of the continuum of players and the law of large numbers. In what follows, we are going to see that the equations of this first class of mean field games have a forward/backward structure: a backward PDE (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) to model the individual backward induction process that explains each agent's choices ; a forward PDE (Kolmogorov) to model the evolution of the players as a whole, the evolution of the community.
We are going to present this first class of mean field games in an abstract way, in the sense that we want the reader to understand the tools and hence we focus on a problem that has explicit solutions. Typically, one may understand the problem as a stochastic control problem in which each individual, in the continuum, chooses a characteristic in a state space to resemble other people (in addition to the wish to be at a given place in some parts -see below). Problems of that kind are quite common (even though specification may be different) if one thinks of technology choices for instance since agents may want to have a good technology but a technology that is widespread among others to avoid paying too much.
In what follows, we consider a continuum of individuals (hereafter a population) that have preferences about resembling each other. This type of problem is typically of the mean field game sort where individuals pay a price to move from one point to another in the state space and have a utility flow that is a function of the overall distribution of individuals in the population. We are going to model it as follows:
• The state space is an n-dimensional space.
• Each agent has a "utility" function v that can be decomposed in two parts: a pure preference part g : (t, x) → g(m(t, x)) (where g is increasing to model the willingness to be like others) that represents what she gets from being having the characteristics x at time t (m is the distribution function of the population) and a pure cost part h : α → h(α) that corresponds to the price to pay to make a move of size α in the state space (h is typically supposed to be increasing, strictly convex and such that h(0) = 0).
• Each agent discounts the time at rate ρ.
• Each agent's characteristics is moved by a brownian motion in dimension n (specific to herself).
The problem we are dealing with can therefore be written as a control problem:
with dXt = α(t, Xt)dt + σdWt.
As for any mean field game we use [LL06a, LL06b] to write the associated system of partial differential equations:
Proposition 1 (Mean Field Games PDEs). The control problem is equivalent to the following system of PDEs
where
Additional conditions are: m(0, ·) given, u(T, ·) = 0 and ∀t, m(t, ·) is a probability distribution function.
Our goal here is to find stationary solutions of this problem in several special cases where we always suppose that T is replaced by +∞ 2 :
(Hamilton − Jacobi)
with m a probability distribution function.
3 The case of quadratic cost and logarithmic utility function 3.1 The basic framework
Presentation
We are going to build a very precise and explicit example that has analytic solutions. First of all, we consider that the cost function h is quadratic, that is h(a) = 1 2 a 2 . Then, we suppose that all people in the population have the same preference function which is simply g(m(t, x)) = ln(m(t, x)). These preferences mean that inside the population, people want to resemble one another. However, they are prevented to do so by the noise and our problem is to find the optimal behavior of individuals in such a context.
To sum up, we want to find stationary solutions to the problem:
In other words, we want to find a solution of the following system of PDEs:
Resolution
Proposition 2 (Gaussian solutions). Suppose that ρ < 2 σ 2 . There exist three constants, s 2 > 0, η > 0 and ω such that ∀µ ∈ R n , if m is the probability distribution function associated to a gaussian variable N (µ, s 2 In) and u(x) = −η|x − µ| 2 + ω, then (u, m) is a solution of our problem.
These three constants are given by:
Interestingly, we can come back to the control parameter α. This control parameter describes the move each agent wants to make given her characteristics. We have the following result:
Proposition 3 (Optimal control). In the framework of the preceding proposition, the optimal control parameter α is given by α(x) = −2η(x − µ). This means that for any agent, her characteristics Xt follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that mean-reverts around µ:
Comments on the preceding example
The preceding example is interesting in the fact that we have been able to exhibit explicit solutions (this can be generalized to a more complex brownian motion). One caveat, though, is that these solutions are specific to the logarithmic case. Another problem with our setting is that we only describe possible stationary solutions and the possible path from an initial distribution to a stationary solution is not dealt with. This comment leads to the third issue in this example which is the infinite number of solutions. This problem can be dealt with in a very simple way. It's indeed possible to say that, in addition to their willingness to be like each others, agents in the population love a certain characteristics µ * . In that case, the stochastic control problem can be replaced by:
With this quadratic form, one can generalize the preceding computations and we get the following localization result.
Proposition 4 (Localization). In this new problem any gaussian solution has to be centered in µ * . The variance coefficient is
where η is now the unique positive solution of:
Stability in the logarithmic case
Let's consider the logarithmic case of the last section and let's work for simplicity in dimension 1 3 . We have found stationary solutions of the problem and up to a translation we can consider that µ = 0 so that the stationary solution we consider is:
An interesting question is the stability of this stationary solution.
We are going to consider two notions of stability. The first notion of stability is the classical physical notion of local stability. If an equilibrium is given, it will be said locally stable in the classical sense if, after a small perturbation, the system goes back (perhaps asymptotically) to the initial equilibrium. A second notion of stability is inspired from the eductive viewpoint in economic theory (see [Gue92] ). Typically, the equilibrium will be said to be locally stable in the eductive sense if, the common knowledge that the equilibrium is in a given neighborhood allows agents to find, by a mental process 4 (i.e. without any time-dependent learning) the actual equilibrium.
Local physical stability
To work on the local stability in the classical sense, we consider the PDEs and we introduce perturbations on the solutions (for µ = 0). These perturbations can be written as:
φ(T, ·) = φ(·) and ψ(0, ·) = ψ(·) are given and represent respectively the relative perturbation on m * and the absolution perturbation on u * 5 .
We are going to study the dynamics of the functions φ and ψ where we consider the linearized PDEs.
Proposition 5 (Linearized PDEs). The linearized PDEs around (u * , m * ) are:
2 φ A stability result can be proved that shows that, under some natural conditions, the system comes back to the initial equilibrium. The exact result is the following:
Proposition 6 (Stability). Suppose that:
• The perturbations ψ and φ are in the Hilbert space H = L 2 (m * (x)dx).
• ψ(x)m * (x)dx (mass preservation condition)
• xψ(x)m * (x)dx (mean preservation condition)
• xφ(x)m * (x)dx (this is guaranteed if the perturbation is even)
Then: lim
Local eductive stability
Now, we are going to consider another notion of stability that has more to do with the justification of rational expectation hypothesis or with the process through which agents will mentally understand what will be the stationary equilibrium.
The goal in the next paragraphs is in fact to consider an initial guess for the stationary equilibrium (in the neighborhood of the actual equilibrium) and to exhibit a "mental process" (this process is actually a continuous process based on two PDEs involving what we call virtual time) that goes from the initial guess to the true equilibrium.
Let's consider the two equations:
We are going to introduce a variable θ called virtual time and consider, given an initial guess (u(θ = 0, x), m(θ = 0, x)) for the equilibrium, the mental process associated with the following system of PDEs:
Since we only want to consider a local eductive stability, we are going to work with the linearized version of these equations that is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (Linearized mental process). The linearized mental process around (u * , m * ) is given by:
2 φ where φ and ψ are defined as before and where φ(0, ·) and ψ(0, ·) are given.
As before, we have a stability result:
Proposition 8 (Local eductive stability). Suppose that:
• The initial guesses φ(0, ·) and ψ(0, ·) are in the Hilbert space H = L 2 (m * (x)dx).
• ψ(0, x)m * (x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess for m is a probability distribution function)
• xφ(0, x)m * (x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even)
• xψ(0, x)m * (x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even)
Then the solution (φ, ψ) of the mental process converges in the sense that:
This proposition proves that given an initial guess in the neighborhood of a stationary solution, if the initial guess is symmetric around the stationary solution, then, the mental process associated to the PDEs allows agents to find the solution. This is what we called local eductive stability.
Remarks on the conditions to have stability results
In both the proof of the physical stability and the proof of the eductive stability, there was a need to impose symmetry conditions on the perturbations or on the initial guesses. If one wants to have stability results for more general initial perturbations or initial guesses, the intuitive idea is to break the translation invariance of the problem. Interestingly, we have done that before in the paragraphs dedicated to localization. This localization idea can be used once again, to have more general stability results. If we center the problem around 0 as before, we know that the only relevant difference between the original problem and the problem with an additional term −δx 2 , that localizes the problem around 0, is the positive constant η that depends on δ according to the equation:
General stability results when δ > 0 can easily be found and one can replace the conditions 
Concluding remarks on the two stability notions
Even though the two kinds of stability look like each other, the two notions of stability we used are completely orthogonal. The physical stability is indeed linked to a perturbation of the system. The system is physically stable because, after an initial perturbation of m * and a final perturbation of u * , under some conditions, the solution of the game is stable in the sense that agents go back to the equilibrium. Hence, the physical stability involves forward/backward reasoning. This is not the case of the eductive stability because the mental process is purely forward (in virtual time). We start from a guess not too far from an equilibrium (the equilibrium being a priori unknown) and the mental process converges toward this equilibrium. The fact that our solutions are stable for both the physical stability and the eductive stability backs up the mean field game approach to find relevant solutions.
Conclusion
The model we presented in this paper is the archetype of a dynamical mean field game model in continuous time with a continuous state space. Even though the specification is simple, examples can be built with different specification and several populations that interact with one another. Numerical methods will be presented to allow for complex specifications in a forthcoming paper by Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions.
